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Reflections on European Polley 
I. The situation 
The process of European unification has reached a critical juncture in its development. If, in 
the next two to four years, no solution to the causes of this critical development is found, the 
Union , contrary to the goal of ever closer union invoked in the Maastricht Treaty, will in , 
e.wncc become a loosely knit grouping of states restricted to certain economic aspects and ·: 
composed of various sub-groupin&s, It would then be no more than a "sophisticated" free-trade i · 
area incapable of ovcrcomiJl& either the existentia1 internal problems of the European societies,_ i 
or the external challenges they face. l 
.. 
The main causes are: 
Overextension of the EU' s institutions which, originally set up for six member 
countries, must now cater for a membership of 12 - soon (it is to be expected) to rise to 
16. 
A growing differentiation of interests, fuclle.d by differences in the level 
socioeconornic development, which threatens to obscure the basic commonality 
interests. , i 
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to the East and in strengthening it through further · deepening. Inde.ed, deepening is a 
precondition for widening. Without such further internal strengthening, the Union would be ' 
unable to meet the enormous challenge of eastward expansion. It might fall apart and once 
again become no more than a loose grouping of states unable to guarantee stability. Only if the 
new system set up after 1945 to regulate conflicts, to effect a balancing of interests, to promote 
mutual development and to ensure Europe•s self-assertion in its external relations can be further 
developed and expanded to take in Germany's neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe, will 
Germany have a chance of becoming a centre of stability in the heart of Europe. This German 
interest in stability is essentially identical with that of Europe. 
Owing to its position, its size and its close relations with France, Germany bears a special 
responsibility and has a major opportunity to play a leading part in promoting a course of 
development which will benefit both it and Europe. 
Following its assumption of the Presidency of the European Union on 1 July 1994, for 
Germany the tremendous long-term efforts needed to achieve this goal have begun. 
m. What must be done? - Proposals 
The above goal can only be achieved through a combination of measures in the institutional • 
sphere and in a number of policy fields. The following five proposals are mutually dependent 
and reinforcing, and fonn an integrate.d whole: 
further develop the EU' s institutions and put subsidiarity into effect, including the 
rmansfcr of powers; 
further strengthen the EU's hard core; 
raise the quality of Franco-German relations to a new level; 
improve the Union's capacity for effective action in the field of foreign and security 
policy; 
expand the Union towards the East. 
It goes without saying that, especially with a view to enhancing public acceptance of European 
integration, these, measures must be accompanied by efforts to combat organized crime, 
establish a comrrton policy on migration, fight unemployment, e.ffllblish a common social 1 
policy, ensure Europe's .continued competitiveness and protect the environment. 
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l. Further developing the EU' s institutions 
The further development of the EU's institutions, which is on the agenda of the 
intergovern?._lental conference in 1996, should be based on the following principles~ 
The goal must be to strengthen the EU' s capacity to act and to make its structures and 
procedures more democratic and federal. 
To this end, the question of who does what must be answered. This should be done in a 
quasi-constitutional document which, in a clear language, describes the division of 
powers between the EU, the nation-states and the regions, and defines the fundamental 
values on which the Union is based. 
This document must be oriented to the model of a ufederal state" and to the principle of 
subsidiarity. This applies not only to the division of powers but also to the question of 
whether public authorities, including those of the Union, should perform certain 
functions or should leave them to groups in society. Gennany, at whose request the 
principle of subsidiarity was incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty, and which has 
experience in applying it, is called upon to put forward recommendations not only on 
how the principle of subsidiarity can be applied to future measures of the EU but also 
on how existing regulations can be adapted to it. 
All existing institutions - the Council, the Commission, the Presidency and the 
European Parliament - must be refonncd. Numerous refonn proposals have been put 
forward, among others by the CDU/CSU parliamentary group. The reform~ must be 
geared to concepts for a new institutional balance, according to which the European 
Parliament will increasingly become a genuine law-making body with the same rights as 
the Council; the Council, in addition to performing tasks in the intergovernmental field 
in particula,r, will assume the functions of a second chamber, i.e. a chamber of the 
member s~tes; and the Commission will take on features of a European government. 
, ;::: . 
.I.. - • - -
I 
I 
1 
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In addition to greater efficiency, democratization must be acknowledged as the guiding 
principle of all reforms. Naturally, this applies first and foremost to the European 
Parliament which is to be closely involved from the outset in the preparations for the 
intergovernmental conference in 1996. This should be accompanied - not preceded - by 
efforts to enhance participation by national parliaments in the decision-making process 
within the EU. With regard to the Council, democratization means striking a better 
balance between the basic equality of all member states, on the one hand, and the ratio 
of population size to number of votes in the Council, on the other. 
The further development of the EU' s institutions must combine coherence and 
consistency with elasticity and flexibility. On the one hand, they must be flexible 
enough to absorb and compensate for the tensions inherent in a Community stretching 
from the North Cape to Gibraltar and differentiated enough to cope with differences in 
member countries' ability (and willingness) to pursue further integration. On the other, 
they must be stron& enough to ensure that, even in the face of tremendous challenges, 
the Union retains its ability to act. 
To achieve this, the "variable geometry" or •multi-speed" approach should as far as 
possible be sanctioned and institutionaliud in the Union Treaty or the new quasi-
constitutional document, despite the considerable legal and practical difficulties 
involved. Otherwise, this approach will continue to be limi~ to intergovernmental 
cooperation, which might well encourage a trend towards a "Europe ~ la carte". It must 
therefore be decided whether, in the case of amendments to the Maastricht Treaty, the 
principle of unanimity laid down in Article N should be replaced by a quorum yet to be 
more clearly specified. It is csxntial that no country should be allowed to use its right 
of veto to block the efforts of other countries more able and willing to intensify their 
cooperation and deepen integration. 
Developing fle:icible approaches to integration, as envisaged for monetary union in the 
Maastricht Treaty and as already practised outside the Treaty within the framewo_rk of the 
Schengen Agreement, appears all the more imperative in view of the immense difficulties the 
above institutional changes will cause even with membership at its present level. As the 
negotiations on the accession of the BFfA countries showed, these difficulties are unlikely to 
diminish in the futu,-e. Just preventing a standstill in the process of integration, which would in 
fact constitute a sf.ef, backwards, would be a major achievement . 
. , 
? 
( 
~ 
I 
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2. Further strengthening the EU's hard core 
In addition to ensuring that the decision-making process within the European Union becomes 
more efficient and democratic, the existing hard core of countries orien~ to greater 
integration and closer cooperation must be further strengthened. At present, the core comprises 
five or six countries. This core must not be closed to other member states; rather, it must be 
open to every member state willing and able to meet its requirements. 
The task of the hard core is, by giving the Union a strong centre, to counteract the centrifugal 
forces generated by constant enlargement and, thereby, to prevent a South-West grouping, 
more inclined to protectionism and beaded in a certain sense by France, drifting apart from a 
North-East grouping, more in favour of free world trade and headed in a certain sense by 
Gennany. 
To this end, the countries of the bard core must not only participate as a matter of course in all 
policy fields, but should also be recognizably more Community-spirited in their joint action 
than others, and launch common initiatives aimed at promoting the development of the Union. 
Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands must therefore be more closely involved in Franco-
Ocrman cooperation - especially since the Netherlands, too, 1w revised its earlier sceptical 
attitude towards the essential function of these two countries as the driving force behind 
European integration. Cooperation among the core countries must focus in particular on the 
new policy fields added to the Treaty of Rome by the Maastricht Treaty. 
In the monetary field, too, there are strong signs that a hard core of five countries is emerging. 
They (together with Denmark and Ireland) arc the ones which come close.st to m~ting the 
convergence criteria stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty. This is especially important since 
monetary union is the cornerstone of political union (and not, as is often believed in Germany, 
an additional element of integration alongside political union). 
' 
' ! 
If monetary union' is to be completed within the set timetable, it will encompass probably no , 
more that a sm~l number of countries - in line with the procedure outlined in the Maastricht 
I 
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Treaty. Even so, it will be completed only if the hard core of five work towards this objective \ 
systematically and with great determination. To this end, in the fields of: 
monetary policy 
fiscal and budgetary policy 
economic and social policy 
they should strive for ever closer coordination and aim to establish common policies, thereby -
irrespective of the formal decisions taken in 1997 or 1999 - laying the fou1\dations for 
monetary union among themselves by that time. 
The core countries must convince all the other members of the EU - in particular founder-
member Italy, but also Spain and, of course, Great Britain - of their_ unreseIVed willingness to 
involve them more close.fy as soon as they have overcome their current problems and in so far 
as they themselves arc willing to work towards the common objectives. The formation of a 
core group of countries is not an end in itself but a means of reconciling the two ostensibly 
conflicting &oals of widening and deepening the European Union. 
3. Raisin~ the qualj ty o! Franco-Qernwuelations to a new level 
The quality of Franco-German relations must be raised to a new lcvcl if the historic process of 
European unification is not to peter out before its reaches its political goal. Therefore, no 
si&niflcant action in the foreign or EU policy fields should be taken without prior consultation 
between France and Germany. Following the end of the East-West conflict, the importance of 
Franco-German cooperation has not diminished; on the contrary, it has increased yet further. 
Germany and France form the core of the hard core. From the outset, they were ~e driving 
force behind European unification. Their special relationship faces a stiff test because it too is 
beginning to show signs of the abovcmentioned differentiation of interests and perceptions, 
which might cause them to drift apart as well. In France there are fears that the process of 
enlargement, taking in first the Scandinavian countries (as well as, in particular, Austria) and 
' later the countriet of Central and Eastern Europe, could transform the Union into a loose 
grouping of states in which Germany might acquire far areater power and thus assume a 
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dominant position. For France, therefore, the issue of deepening the Union prior to I 
enlargement is of vital importance. Now that Germany is reunited and - more importantly in 
this context - now that it can once again pursue an active foreign policy in the East and enjoys 
the same freedom of action as its partners in the West, the old question of how to integrate a '. 
powerful Germany into European structures, which arose when the process of European l 
unification - limited initially to western Europe - began, assumes a new, if not in fact its real, . 
meaning. 
It is important for Franco-Gennan relations in particular that this question be ad~ed frankly 
in order to avoid misunderstandings and mistrust. 
An initial answer can be given by pointing to the fact - important for Germany too - that a 
desire not to become too dependent on Gennany is, to a not incopaj.~crable degr~, the reason 
why its eastern neighbours (like the EFrA countries before them) ·ire keen to join the EU. i 
However, this can only be achieved in a community which is more than just a free-trade area. 
It is vital, of course, that precisely at this point in time Germany should, -through its policies, 
demonstrate its unwavering oommitme.nt to the goal of a strong and integrated Europe capable 
of effective action. (Germany believes it has long since provided proof of its commitment but, 
as the criticism of the way it proceeded with regard to the accession of the Scandanavian 
countries and Austria shows, this view is not shared everywhere.) Germany must furnish the 
required proof in proposals on ways to deepen the Union in institutional and political terms , 
I 
before further enlargement. These proposals must nevertheless also be made with a view to the : 
future enlar&ement of the Union. 
If Germany puts forward clear and unequivocal proposals, then France must make equally clear 
I 
and unequivocal decisions. It must rectify the impression that, although it allows no doubt as to l 
its basic will to pursue European integrntion, it often hesitates in taking concrete steps towards 
this objective - the notion of the unsurrenderable sovereignty of the ·Etat nation" still carries 
weight, although this sovereignty has long since become an empty shell. I 
I 
In view of the importance of monetary union for Franco-German relations in particular, 
attempts must be made - in addition to preparations within the hard core of countries - to 
overcome diffci:e,ces of opinion between France and German on fundamental issues of 
economic policy. These include the substance of •industrial policy• and competition law. In 
this connection, it would be a positive step if agreement could be reached on a European cartel , 
+4'3- 2.28- 16-85128 C[JLJ ,..:.su FRHk T 1 1 ON 70'3 Pl 1 08 . 0'3 . '3<4 l:.: _ 
10 
office. There must also be a debate on the long-term objectives of the common agricultural 
policy and on the basic features of the Union's future financial system. 
The same goes for the frequent divergence of views in France and Germany on the central 
issue of a common European defence and its relationship to NATO (as evident, for instance, in 
the current discussions on ways to implement the decision on the sercalled combined joint task / 
forces (CJTF) taken at the NATO summit in January 1994). 
On both issues, the corresponding Franco-German councils (economic and 50eial council, j 
defence cou~-cil) should be used as a forum for a thorough, unbiased and undoctrinaire debate. ! 
More than ever before, Germany's relations with France are the yardstick by which to measure : 
its sense of belonging to the West's community of shared politi~ and cultural values, as ! 
opposed to the tendency;- gaining ground once again especially amorig intellectuals, to seek a . 
"German special path•. This is especially important since, now that the East-West conflict has 
come to an end, the USA can no longer play its traditional role in the same way. Conducting a 
serious and open dialogue on the attitudes which underpin such tendencies, and on the mutual , 
sentiments and resentments in the Franco-German rclationship1 is just 
enhancing the quality of political cooperation between the two countries. 
I 
as important as ! 
I 
I 
I 
4. Improving !hi; !lnion's capacity flll: effective action in the field of foxeirro and s!l£1!litv I 
~ 
Giving the Union the capacity to take even more effective action in the field of foreign and , 
security policy is of vital importance for the future. 
The nation-states of Europe are no longer capable of guaranteeing their extcma: security I 
individually, especially in view of the fact that other security problems to have been overcome 1 
in Europe have remerged and that, following the end of the East-West confrontation, the \ 
USA' s assistance in resolving every kind of conflict is no longer certain. 
' 
A state's ability t& guarantee its external securlty - its ability to defend itself w is, however, the j 
precondition for, and ~e quintessence of, sovereignty. This applies in tum to the EU as a 1 
\ . 
• I • 
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community of states inasmuch as only within the community can nation-states preserve their 
sovereignty. Moreover, because a nation's awareness of its sovereignty detennines not only its 
self-perception but also its relations with other nations, the common defence capability of this : 
European community of states constitutes an indispensible factor in endowing the EU with an 
identity of its own, an identity which, however, at the same time leaves room for the sense of : 
identity of each individual state. 
In the few years since the end of the :East-West conflict, a common foreign and security policy 
has become more important and more urgent than envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty. Not even '. 
=-
the larger member states are capable of addressing the new external challenies alone. All 1 
opinion polls show that a Iar&e majority of citizens would like to see a ~mmon foreign and 1 
security policy. The inadequacy of the Union's ~nse to the dramatic developments in the ' 
eastern part of Europe has led to clear drop in public support (ot the process of European I 
unification. The question-of the security status of future members is of decisive importance for 
the political make-up of Europe, and for its entire political order. 
/ 
Action by the European Union in the field of foreign and security policy must be based on-.a ! 
strategic concept which clearly defines common interests and objectives and stipulates the ! 
J 
conditions and procedures as well u the political, economic and financial means. The common I 
foreign and security policy must give priority to . the following fields: 1 
a common policy geared to stabilizin& Central and Eastern Europe; 
development of {elations with Russia with the aim of estabishing a wide-ranging 
partnership; 
a common policy in the Meditcmmcan, where stability is of fundamental concern not 
\ 
only to the littoral states but to Germany as well; I 
development of a strate&ic partnership with Turkey; 
reorientation of transatlantic relations: transatlantic relations are especially important 1 
because they encompass all the issues arising in the context of the common foreign and I 
~urity .po~cy. For this reason, the European Union an.d the USA must fo~ulate a j 
Joint policy in these fields. They must also coordinate their efforts to address the global \ 
challenge.,. 
The creation of a. common European defence is a matter of much greater urgency than 1 
envisaged in the ~tricht Treaty. It should be done now, rather than "in time" as stated in 
the Treaty. The urgcnty of this demand hu been underlined by the European countries ' 
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difficulties among themselves and with the USA over the war in the former Yugoslavia. The 
efforts to establish a common defence must therefore be intensified. The Europeans must 
assume a far greater share of the responsibility for their own security. This goes, on the one 
hand, for measures to preserve and to enforce peace. On the other, it applies even more to the 
question of the security status of future members of the Union. In a community of states which 
sees itself as a genuine union, all members must enjoy the same status with regard to their 
security. That is a precondition of membership. But if the USA is to be expected to show a I 
willingness not only to maintain its commitment in the present territory of the Alliance but to I 
extend it (at least) to those countries which become members of the Union, thcn"'in the non-
nuclear field-Europe must itself make the main contribution to it.s own defence. 
Looking ahead, this means transforming NATO into an alliance within which Europe and the 
USA and Canada carry equal weight and fonn a unit capable of effective action. In this sense, 
~. I 
the intergovernmental cofifcrcnce in 1996 must reorganize the relations between the EU and the 
WEU in accordance with Article J.4, paragraph 6. I 
With regard to the current issue of restructuring the relations between the WEU and NATO as , 
regards tasks not covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (CJTF), a solution must be 1 
I 
found which, on the basis of a decision by the NATO Council in each individual case (and ' 
thus, of course, with the involvement of the USA), allows the Europeans to take independent l 
action using NATO resources and parts of the NATO staffs. As President Clinton's most recent \ 
speech in Paris apin made clear, the USA not only welcomes but indeed calls for the creation 
of a European defence identity. 
I 
I 
An active and effective common foreign and security policy require.1 a more flexible and 
efficient system of management and coordination. To this end, a hi&h-level planning cell with 
access to national policy-makers, and concerned exclusively with forward-looking planning I 
I 
work. must be set up. 1 
I 
I 
Excursus 
To propose the formation of a hard core in Europe and the further intensification of Franco-
Ge.rman cooperation does not, however, imply the abandon.in& of hopes that Great Britain will ! 
assume its role "u the heart of Europe" and thus in its core. Rather, these proposals are born 
of the conviction that ~mtlncd efforts to spur on the further developmt.nt of Europe are the 
.. 
: I 
'I 
.. 
. 
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best means of exerting a positive influence on the clarification of Great Britain's relationship to 
Europe and on its willingness to participate in further steps towards integration. 
5, Enlarginc the EU towards the East 
Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Huniary (and Slovenia) should become Members of 
the European Union around the year 2000. Their acce.,sion should depend on the 
implementation of the measures outlined above and also be their objective. 
The certain prospect of EU membership, and membership itself even more so, is more likely to 
promote the political and economic development of these countries than any fortI} of external 
. -. 
assistanc.e. Apart from the clear political and psychological advantages, accession at that time 
would, however, impose such a serious economic strain on members old and new that it will ' 
only be possible through a combination of measures. They include not only the approximation 
of laws in the acceding countries, already provided for in the Europe agreements, but also · 
changes in various ficlda of BU policy, above all with regard to agriculture. In addition, to ; 
allow for economic adjustment there must be very long transitional periods (probably varying · 
in length from country to country), which will be a case for the applications of the concept of 
·variable eeomctry•. The result must be that the costs for both sides are no higher than would 
be the case if acccuion were to take place at a later date. It must be borne in mind that the later 
accession takes place, the hi&her the costs are likely to be. 
> 
The accession of thC3C countries must take place in stages and be accompanied by a further 1 
deepening of cooperation. Hence the following proposals: 
implement fully the opening of markets envisa&ed in the Europe agreements; 
coordinate trade policy; 
promote free trade and cooperation among the reformina countries; 
extend the participation of Central and Eastern Europr.an countries as reprds certain 
areas of the BU's common foreign and security policy, i.e. multilatcralli:e cooperation; · 
implement cooperation in the security field in line with the ICirchbetg Declaration on 
"~ yartne.rship" with the WEU; 
with regard to jumce and home affairs, involve these countries in cooperation in the 
fields of aliens, "JrUiration, asylum and visa policy as well as with BUROPOL. 
I~ 
\ 
•' 
I 
I 
.. 
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The integration of the Central and Ea.stem European countries into the European Union must be 
accompanied by the establishment of a wide-ranging partnership between the EU and Russia. 
As far as it is possible from outside, this policy must give Russia the certainty that, alongside 
the EU, it is acknowledged as the other centre of the political order in Europe. The agreement 
on partnership and cooperation with Russia is a first major step in this direction. It must be 
followed by security agreements in connection with the accession of the Central and E.astern 
European countries to the EU/WEU and NATO. 
... 
Implementafron of the programme proposed above offers the best chance of overcomin& the 
current uncertainties among our citizens with regard to the process of European unification. 
Unlike some intellectuals - and occasionally politicians too - who express views and opinions 
which are not only ill-considered and ill-informed but also far removed from reality, purely 
theoretical and legalistic; and politically dangerous, the large ~ajority of ci~s clearly 
recognize the need for European unity. However, they quite rightly expect more democracy, 
openness and transparency, and, above all, successful policies by the EU in me above fields. 
Basically, our citiuns know full well that Gennany's interests can only be ttati:red in, with and 
through Europe, and that, far from posing a threat to the nation, this in fact safeguards its 
essence becauac it aafcguards its future. 
BoM, Augwt 30, 1994 
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